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Revisiting Sanctions on Russia and 
Counter-Sanctions on the EU: 
The economic impact three years later 
Daniel Gros and Mattia Di Salvo 
n June 28th, the European Council took a decision to prolong the economic sanctions 
imposed on Russia until 31 January 2018. These sanctions: 1) limit access to EU capital 
markets for major Russian state-owned financial institutions and energy and defence 
companies, 2) ban both the export and import of arms, 3) ban the export of dual-use goods for 
military use to Russia and 4) curtail Russia’s access to certain sensitive technologies and services 
that can be used for oil production and exploration.1 
As expected, Russia has mirrored the EU’s decision by imposing counter-sanctions of its own. 
These involve introducing travel bans against a blacklist of 89 EU politicians and military leaders 
as well as blocking imports of selected categories of agro-food products from the EU and other 
countries that had previously imposed economic sanctions on Russia (e.g. the US, Australia and 
Japan). More specifically, the economic part of the counter-sanctions imposed by Russia 
focused on five categories of western agro-food products (namely fruit, vegetables, meat, fish 
and dairy products), which were originally adopted in August 2014 for a period of two years. 
But Russia recently re-imposed these counter-sanctions in response to the latest extension of 
EU sanctions decided by the Council in June.     
This Commentary is a follow-up to Gros and Mustilli (2016), drawing on more recent data on 
trade flows and analysing more closely the impact on the agro-food export categories, which is 
the target of Russian counter-sanctions.2 
                                                     
1 For further information on EU sanctions on Russia, see EU restrictive measures in response to the crisis in Ukraine. 
2 Note that the analysis is carried out at two-digit levels and, therefore, is not comprehensive of products impacted 
by counter sanctions at a more disaggregate level of analysis (i.e. six-digits or beyond). These products are 
Sausages (1601 00) and Food or finished products (1901 90 11 00, 1901 90 91 00) and their mixtures 
O 
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Using data up to mid-2015, Gros and Mustilli (2016) showed that EU exporters did not lose 
market share in overall Russian imports. It is important to first look at the development of 
overall (and agro-food) Russian imports to disentangle the impact of the recession caused by 
lower oil prices from the impact of the sanctions/counter-sanctions. Indeed, the decline of 
Russian imports coincided with the occurrence of two key developments: the fall in oil prices 
(triggering a recession in Russia) and the adoption of bilateral sanctions in mid-2014. Looking 
only at Russian import values from the EU would thus give a distorted picture of the impact of 
bilateral sanctions on EU competitiveness in the Russian market. 
Table 1 below presents the basic data. In the two-year period after implementation of the 
bilateral sanctions (July 2014-July 2016), overall monthly Russian imports fell by about 44%), 
whereas imports from the EU fell by about 48%, i.e. by a similar order of magnitude. The decline 
in overall Russian imports of food was higher, e.g. -68.3% for meat and -65.4% for vegetables. 
But in those agro-food categories affected by Russian counter-sanctions, EU producers were 
practically excluded from this declining market. As shown in Table 1, Russian imports of EU 
agro-food have been reduced almost to zero over the two-year period July 2014-July 2016.  
Table 1. Change in overall Russian imports and Russian imports of counter-sanctioned goods, 
 July 2014-July 2016 
 
Imports from the 
World 
% change July 2014-
July 2016 
(decrease in $ mil) 
Imports from the EU28 
% change July 2014-
July 2016 
(decrease in $ mil) 
Value of imports 
from the world 
July 2016 
 ($ mil) 
Total imports 
-43.9% 
(-12,028.4) 
-48.7% 
(-5,528.7) 
15,400.5 
All categories subject to 
counter-sanctions 
- 56.5% 
(1015.4) 
-96.8%) 
(419.5) 
781 
   Meat (02) 
-68.3% 
(-424.6) 
-97.7% 
(-37.6) 
197.0 
   Fish (03) 
-54.6% 
(-118.3) 
-97.6% 
(-11.6) 
98.4 
  Dairy (04) 
-48.9% 
(-171.9) 
-92.5% 
(152.9) 
179.4 
   Vegetables (07) 
-65.4% 
(-104.4) 
-99.7% 
(-53.6) 
55.2 
   Fruits (08) 
-43.9% 
(-196.1) 
-100.0% 
(-164.0) 
250.9 
Source: Authors’ own elaboration based on International Trade Centre, Trade Map monthly series. 
                                                     
 (2106 90 920 0, 2106 90 9804, 2106 90 9805 and 2106 90 9809). See https://ec.europa.eu/food/sites/food/files/ 
safety/docs/ia_eu-russia_ru-eu-import-ban_20140820_unoff-trans-en.pdf for more information. 
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Nonetheless, as observed above, one has to analyse the situation in relative terms. Total 
Russian imports of these agro-food products fell by over $1 billion, while imports from Europe 
fell by about $420 million, or 40% of the total. 
If one wants to calculate the impact of the counter-sanctions on European exports, one could 
assume that, in the absence of the counter-sanctions, the EU would have a share of about one-
half of total Russian imports in these categories in July 2016, or about $400 million. This is not 
an important figure for an economy the size of the EU.   
Moreover, food is a relatively homogenous commodity and the cheese that is no longer shipped 
to Russia can presumably be sold elsewhere. EU exporters of the affected food categories have 
in the meantime found other outlets. Any harm that had been done initially must thus by now 
have been repaired.3 In fact, overall (extra-)EU exports of these agro-food categories have 
increased since mid-2014.4 Russian counter-sanctions do not seem to have had much effect in 
the overall development of these sectors. 
The relatively limited share of these categories of goods in the European exports basket 
destined for Russia explains why the EU, overall, has not significantly lost market share in the 
Russian market. In fact, the EU’s share in total Russian imports decreased very little and only 
gradually since the implementation of bilateral sanctions. In the year prior to implementation 
of bilateral sanctions (i.e. August 2013-July 2014), the EU’s market share in total Russian 
imports was, on average, 42%. This share has decreased by 4.8% points when compared to the 
average market share in the six-month period August 2016-January 2017.  
On the other hand, the share of EU goods affected by counter-sanctions in total Russian imports 
of such categories collapsed in July 2014, and not recovered since. Figure 1 shows the 
development of the EU and US market shares in Russian imports of both counter-sanctioned 
goods (dashed lines) and all other goods.  
                                                     
3 See Daniel Gros, “A European sanctions compensation fund?”, CEPS Commentary, CEPS, Brussels, 12 August 
2014. 
4 In August 2014, overall extra-EU exports of Meat (02), Fish (03), Dairy (04), Vegetables (07) and Fruits (08) 
together reached €2 billion. In March 2017, the same categories of goods registered an extra-EU export value of 
€3 billion. 
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Figure 1. Shares of the EU and the US in Russian imports of counter-sanctioned goods and  
other goods 
 
 
Note: The category sanctioned includes the following HS categories: Meat (HS 2), Fish (HS 3), Dairy (HS 4), 
Vegetables (HS 7) and Fruits (HS 8). 
Source: Authors’ own elaboration based on International Trade Centre, Trade Map monthly series. 
 
President Putin has claimed that the counter-sanctions regarding agro-food imports were good 
for Russia. In reality, however, they might have contributed to the reduction of the purchasing 
power of Russian consumer. Consumer prices increased significantly in the year following the 
adoption of sanctions, and more interestingly, the part including food only has increased more 
than the CPI excluding food. Food prices increased 8% more than the prices of other goods 
between July 2014 and July 2015 (see Figure 2). 
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Figure 2. Russian Consumer Price Index since adoption of sanctions (Index July 2014 = 1,  
not seasonally adjusted) 
 
Source: Authors’ own elaboration based on FRED and OECD, “Main Economic Indicators - complete database”. 
 
That the Russian counter-sanctions had a significant impact is not surprising, given the 
dependency of Russia on agro-food imports coming from the EU. For instance, in 2012, Russian 
domestic production of goods subject to counter-sanctions satisfied around 75% of the 
country’s consumption of meat and milk 
Summing up, it is evident that the position of European exporters in the Russian market has 
not been infringed (at least not significantly) since the adoption of bilateral sanctions. The 
impact of the Russian counter-sanctions on agro-food imports from the EU has been minimal. 
Russian imports of these goods have fallen by about €400 million, which is less than one-third 
of one percent of EU GDP. But overall EU exports of these goods have actually increased, 
showing that exports could quickly be redirected and that the sector has not suffered any 
overall damage from the sanctions. 
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